Chio Research · Whitepaper

Proof-Carrying Bilateral Admission

for Cross-Organization Agent Tool Calls

A correctly signed vendor record can still describe the wrong request, outcome, treaty, or continuation. Before any tool runs, the receiving kernel checks it against its own treaty state and rejects stale, replayed, or mismatched calls.

Rust + Lean 420 named negative casesUSENIX Security 2027

01Receiver-Owned Admission

deny before dispatch

The receiver decides what enters its history.

The receiving kernel treats a counterparty-mediated-decision receipt as one predicate-model input to admission. It reconstructs the claim from verifier-owned state and rejects invalid records before dispatch.

Resolve

receiver stores → treaty + keys + continuation

The receiver resolves treaty configuration, signer keys, and continuation state from its own stores. Request metadata cannot install signer keys.

verifier-owned inputscrates/kernel/chio-runtime-core/src/admission_hook/store_artifacts.rs

Co-sign

sigA ∧ sigB over one canonical predicate

Two distinct configured keys sign the same DSSE predicate. The verifier rejects split or malformed statements.

strict bilateral DSSEcrates/trust/chio-federation/src/bilateral_dsse/verify.rs

Bind

request ∧ outcome ∧ treaty ∧ lineage ∧ receipts

The predicate binds the request and outcome to the treaty scope, continuation, lineage, and both receipts.

one cross-boundary claimcrates/kernel/chio-runtime-core/src/admission_hook/treaty_evidence.rs

Decide

admit(view) ∨ deny before dispatch

The kernel evaluates the bounded view and denies missing, stale, replayed, mismatched, or policy-rejected admission records.

fail-closed decisioncrates/kernel/chio-runtime-core/src/admission_hook.rs

02Predicate Bindings

one canonical cross-boundary claim

One predicate binds the whole claim.

The verifier does not accept a loose bag of valid signatures. It requires one canonical statement whose fields agree across the request, treaty, continuation, lineage, and receipts.

Request

Request identifier, action class, capability, and receiver context.

Outcome

The accepted or denied result and its stable failure code.

Treaty

Scope hash, participant kernels, allowed actions, and ladder intersection.

Continuation

A live, capability-bound continuation consumed once by the receiver.

Lineage

The receipt-lineage statement and its authenticated digest.

Local receipt

The receiver-side mediated-decision receipt named by the predicate.

Remote receipt

The counterparty receipt is one predicate input. A valid signature alone does not admit it.

Bilateral digest

Exactly one verified bilateral-invocation digest bound to the report.

admit(view) verify(sigA, sigB, predicate) Ktreaty(view) Kleft(view) Kright(view)

The bounded Lean result characterizes admission as structural predicate intersection. Rust tests exercise production validation around the view independently.

03Bounded Formal Results

4 headline theorems · Lean 4

The model states exactly what Lean checks.

These are machine-checked theorems over a bounded ReceiptView and explicit finite domains. Differential tests compare the production evaluator with an independent Rust reference; they do not turn the runtime into extracted or fully verified code.

  1. Bounded theoremChecked
    treaty_admission_iff_predicate_intersection∀ τ r. treatyAdmits(τ, r) ⇔ treatyPredInter(τ, r)

    In the bounded receipt view, treaty admission is extensionally equal to the conjunction of the treaty and participant predicates.

    formal/lean4/Chio/Chio/Treaty/IntersectionSyntactic.lean
  2. Bounded theoremChecked
    treaty_admission_stable_under_ladder_floorm ≥ modeFloor → admitsUnderMode(τ, m, r) = admits(τ, r)

    Once the declared finite ladder floor is satisfied, the mode check reduces to the treaty predicate.

    formal/lean4/Chio/Chio/Treaty/IntersectionSyntactic.lean
  3. Bounded theoremChecked
    refinesOnConstitution_iffrefinesOn(candidate, current, domain) = true ⇔ noWideningOn(domain)

    For the strict predicate syntax, the executable Boolean check is exact on the supplied finite receipt domain.

    formal/lean4/Chio/Chio/Treaty/PredicateLang.lean
  4. Bounded theoremChecked
    bridge_decidable_soundnessdecideRefinement = true → ∀ r ∈ domain, candidate(r) → current(r)

    A positive finite-domain check implies semantic no-widening on that declared domain.

    formal/lean4/Chio/Chio/Treaty/PredicateLang.lean

04Measured Evaluation

eight-core Arm · SQLite loopback

The evaluated path is source-bound.

The recorded results name a clean producer commit and hash their benchmark inputs. The full path includes receiver-owned stores, strict bilateral verification, policy evaluation, and buyer review.

2.288 s

Full receiver admission

p50 · 2.428 s p99 · 20 release-profile runs

13.406 ms

Pre-dispatch treaty denial

p50 · 22.826 ms p99 · 30 samples · zero tool invocations

20

Named negative cases

Malformed, stale, replayed, smuggled, and policy-denied inputs

1,024 × 3

Generated differential cases

Predicates, constitutions, and finite refinement, plus exhaustive atoms

The buyer-closure performance test measured Ed25519 receipt signing at 242.4 μs p50 and verification at 370.2 μs p50. The paper reports the generic replay corpus and bilateral threat matrix separately.

05Scope and Source

claims, limits, source

What the result does, and what it does not.

The paper keeps production enforcement, bounded theorems, differential alignment, measurements, and operational assumptions as separate claim classes.

Keys are not organizations

Two distinct configured keys may still be controlled by one actor. Organizational independence is an operational assumption.

The model is bounded

Lean proves the named properties over ReceiptView and explicit finite domains. It is not Rust extraction or whole-runtime verification.

The benchmark is local

The measured three-vendor loopback ran on one eight-core Arm host with SQLite. It is not a wide-area deployment result.

Sovereignty is receipt-bounded

The term names local authority over a receipt-admission boundary. It does not imply legal statehood or external institutional control.

Implementation and source map

Receiver admission hook

Resolves verifier-owned state and makes the pre-dispatch decision.

crates/kernel/chio-runtime-core/src/admission_hook.rs

Treaty claim binding

Checks request, outcome, scope, continuation, lineage, and receipt digests.

crates/kernel/chio-runtime-core/src/admission_hook/treaty_evidence.rs

Strict bilateral DSSE

Verifies two configured Ed25519 keys over one canonical predicate.

crates/trust/chio-federation/src/bilateral_dsse/verify.rs

Bounded predicate evaluator

Evaluates the strict receipt-view predicate syntax and finite refinement.

crates/kernel/chio-runtime-core/src/treaty/predicate.rs

Lean model and differential tests

Checks the bounded theorems and compares independent Rust semantics over generated cases.

formal/lean4/Chio/Chio/Treaty/ · formal/diff-tests/tests/treaty_predicate_diff.rs

Source-bound research package

Pins the manuscript, theorem inventory, benchmarks, and extracted Lean archive.

scripts/check-programmable-sovereignty-artifact.sh

Read the full construction, bounded proofs, evaluation, and limitations in the paper.